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Abstract
In September of 2013 the Supreme Court of Japan issued two judgments
dealing with the constitutionality of statutory schemes that discriminated
based on legitimacy. The first case resulted in the Court finding the
provision unconstitutional, a rare occurrence in Japan. The second case
found no constitutional problem to exist. This article will compare and
contrast the two decisions while explaining the family law context in
which they arose. It also offers an explanation of how the Court could
arrive at two seemingly contradictory conclusions at almost the same time
in its history.

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 100
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE JUDICIAL
POWER IN JAPAN ............................................................................ 101
III. THE INHERITANCE CASE.......................................................... 103
A. The Case within the Context of Japanese Family Law ..... 103
B. The Facts, Issues and Rationale ........................................ 105
ii. The Facts ....................................................................... 105
iii.
The Issues ................................................................. 106

2014]

LEGITIMACY BASED DISCRIMINATION

100

iv. The Rationale ................................................................ 106
C. Standards of Review ......................................................... 110
D. The Inheritance Case: Another Glimmer of Hope? .......... 115
E. Implementation ................................................................. 116
i. The Significance ........................................................... 116
ii. The Dilemma ................................................................ 118
iii.
The Solution.............................................................. 119
IV. THE REGISTRATION CASE........................................................ 120
A. Background ....................................................................... 120
i. The Family Register and Family Law .......................... 121
ii. The Facts of the Registration Case ............................... 129
B. The Case............................................................................ 130
C. So Much for Social Change .............................................. 133
V. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION ................................................. 134
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2013, Japan’s Supreme Court issued two separate
judgments relating to the constitutionality of statutory and regulatory
provisions that discriminated based on legitimacy. In both cases, the
opinion of the Court was unanimous. The first, decided on September 4,
found unconstitutional Article 900(iv) of the Japanese Civil Code, which
granted to children born out of wedlock a statutory share of inheritance
only half that accorded legitimate children. 1 Such action violated the

*Professor, Doshisha Law School. LL.M. Tohoku University, J.D./LL.M. Duke
University School of Law; Life Member, Clare Hall, the University of Cambridge.
The author would like to thank Professor David S. Law at the Washington
University School of Law for his kind comments on a draft of this article.
† All English translations of Japanese-language materials referenced in this article
are by the author unless otherwise noted.
1
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand Bench) Sept. 4, 2013, 2012 (ku) no. 984 &
985, 67 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1320, available at,
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/ text/2013.09. 04-2012.-Ku.No..984.and.985-195441.html (English translation) [hereinafter Inheritance
Case]. Prior to its amendment in December 2013 the provision at issue read as
follows:
If there are two or more heirs of the same rank, their shares in inheritance shall be
determined by the following items: . . .
(iv) if there are two or more children, lineal ascendants, or siblings, the share in
the inheritance of each shall be divided equally; provided that the share in
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constitutional guarantee of equal treatment under the law and was thus
void with respect to the estate at issue.2 This case will be referred to in this
article as the “Inheritance Case.”
The second case, decided on September 26, involved an equal
protection challenge to Article 49(2)(i) of the Family Register Act, which
requires parents reporting a birth to indicate whether or not the child was
born in wedlock.3 In this case the court found no constitutional violation.
It will be referred to as the “Registration Case.”
Both cases arose under Article 14(1) of the Constitution of Japan,
which reads as follows: “All of the people are equal under the law and
there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations
because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.”4

II. AN OVERVIEW OF
POWER IN JAPAN

THE

SUPREME COURT

AND THE JUDICIAL

Under Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution, “[t]he Supreme
Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.” 5 This has

inheritance of an child out of wedlock shall be one half of the share in inheritance
of a child in wedlock, and the share in inheritance of a sibling who shares only
one parent with the decedent shall be one half of the share in inheritance of a
sibling who shares both parents.
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] 1896, art. 900, para. iv,
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2058&vm=04&re=02Son
y&new=1 (unofficial English translation) (Part IV and V).
2
Inheritance Case, supra note 1.
3
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (1st Petty Bench) Sept. 26, 2013, 2012 (Gyō tsu) no.
399, 67 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1384, available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/ text/ 2013.09.26-2012.-Gyo-Tsu.No..399.html (English translation) [hereinafter Registration Case]. Article 49(1)
of the Family Register Act requires the report of a birth to be filed with the
registration authorities within 14 days of birth (or three months if the child is born
abroad). KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 49, para. 1.
Paragraph (2) of the same article contains a list of items of information that need
to be included in the report, including (i) gender and “whether the child is born in
or out of wedlock.” Id. para. 2.
4
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14, para. 1. In addition to the
equal treatment mandate contained in paragraph (1), paragraphs (2) and (3)
prohibit peerages and any type of hereditary honor. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ
[KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14.
5
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81.
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been interpreted as being an “ancillary” power of constitutional review
(futaiteki iken shinsaken), meaning that there must be a justiciable case or
controversy before the Court in order for it to make a constitutional
determination, similar to the US System.6 Such a requirement necessitates
that inferior courts also have the power to rule on constitutional issues,
even though the Constitution itself only clearly vests the power in the
Supreme Court.7
Fifteen justices sit on the Court,8 which is actually four distinct
panels, or benches. 9 There are three Petty Benches comprised of five
justices each. 10 These dispose of most of the Court’s docket, which is
voluminous, since in theory the Supreme Court has the final word on
matters of interpretation involving all areas of Japanese law, not just the
Constitution.
In addition to the three Petty Benches, all fifteen justices
sometimes sit en banc as the Grand Bench. Under the Court Act, only the
Grand Bench may issue a ruling of unconstitutionality or overrule a prior
Grand Bench interpretation.11 By contrast, a Petty Bench may resolve the
matter if it involves a constitutional ruling consistent with the prior Grand
Bench decision.12
This brings us to an important difference between the two cases;
the Inheritance Case was decided by the Grand Bench. Article 900(iv) of
the Civil Code had previously been found not to violate Article 14(1) of

See, e.g., SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN – A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 135-40. (2011).
7
Id. at 120-21.
8
See SAIBANSHOHŌ [Courts Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 5, para. 1, 3 (stating
the Supreme Court is comprised of a Chief Justice and fourteen Justices of the
Supreme Court).
9
SAIKŌSAIBANSHO SAIBANJIMU SHORI KISOKU [Sup. Ct. Admin. Rules], Sup. Ct.
Rule No. 6 of 1947, art. 1-2,
http://www.courts.go.jp/kisokusyu/sonota_kisoku/sonota_kisoku_06/index.html.
10
Id. art. 2.
11
See SAIBANSHOHŌ [Court Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 10. (providing that “a
petty bench may not give a judicial decision” in cases in which involve a
determination on the constitutionality of law, cases in which a “law, order, rule or
disposition is to be decided as unconstitutional,” and cases in which an
interpretation or application of the Constitution is contrary to a “decision
previously rendered by the Supreme Court”).
12
According to Supreme Court rules, a case may also be referred from a Petty
Bench to the Grand Bench in the event of a split among the Petty Bench panel or
when otherwise deemed appropriate. Supreme Court Trial Rules, art. 9.
6
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the Constitution in a 1995 Grand Bench decision (referred to in this article
as the “1995 Decision”). 13 This view was affirmed in subsequent Petty
Bench decisions as well.14 Thus, even before the decision was announced,
the mere news that the Inheritance Case was reviewed by the Grand Bench
caused speculation that the 1995 Decision would be overturned;15 only a
Petty Bench decision would have been required to reaffirm the
constitutionality of Article 900(iv).16
Conversely, the Registration Case was heard by a Petty Bench.
The decision did not find a statute or government act to be
unconstitutional or conflict with a prior Grand Bench precedent on the
issue.17

III. THE INHERITANCE CASE
A. The Case within the Context of Japanese Family Law
Since its establishment in 1947, Japan’s Supreme Court has only
held a provision in a statute to be unconstitutional on nine occasions,18
most recently the Inheritance Case.19 The reluctance of the Supreme Court
to invalidate legislation on constitutional grounds is one reason why some
scholars refer to the Court as being highly “conservative” or describe

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand Bench) July 5, 1995, 1991 (ku) no. 143, 49
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1789,
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1995.07.05-1991-Ku-No.143155301.html (English translation) [hereinafter 1995 Decision].
14
See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (2nd Petty Bench) Sept. 30, 2009, 1314
HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]123 [hereinafter 2009 Decision].
15
See, e.g., Top Court May Annul Inheritance Disparity, THE JAPAN TIMES (Jul.
10, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/07/10/national/top-court-mayannul-inheritance-disparity/#.UzI2oK1dU8x.
16
Sup. Ct. Admin. Rules, supra note 9, art. 9.
17
Registration Case, supra note 3.
18
See David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in
Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1547 (2009) (noting that in 2009 (before the
Inheritance Case) the Supreme Court of Japan ruled eight statutes unconstitutional
since the Court’s creation in 1947).
19
Inheritance Case, supra note 1. The Supreme Court has also held the
application of statutes and regulations – i.e., government acts – to be
unconstitutional on about a dozen other occasions. See Law, supra note 18, at
1547-48 (describing laws and rules found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
of Japan).
13
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judicial constitutional review as having “failed” in Japan. 20 This article
will neither seek to endorse nor challenge these characterizations.
Suffice it to say, however, the Inheritance Case is significant. Not
only is it one of the Court’s few unconstitutionality rulings, but it is the
first instance of the Court invalidating a provision of the Japanese Civil
Code. Containing the rules of property, contract, tort, family law and
inheritance, the Civil Code is one of the most basic canons of Japanese
law. Much of it also predates the current Constitution by half a century,
although parts, particularly the sections dealing with family law and
inheritance, were substantially rewritten during the American occupation,
as is discussed in more detail below.
For this reason alone, the Inheritance Case may prove particularly
important. In addition to the discriminatory provisions of Article 900(iv),
the Civil Code contains a number of other provisions that would on their
face seem suspect under Article 14(1), including: different age thresholds
for marriage based upon gender (Article 731),21 a requirement prohibiting
remarriage within six months of divorce applicable only to women
(Article 733), 22 a statutory presumption that a child born to a woman
within 300 days of her divorce is her ex-husband’s (Article 772),23 and the
default vesting in mothers of sole parental authority over children born out
of wedlock (Article 819(4)). 24 Some of these provisions would seem
constitutionally problematic, not only under Article 14(1) but also under
Article 24. Article 24 of the Constitution requires that all laws pertaining
to marriage and the family be “enacted from the standpoint of individual

20

See, e.g., David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1425 (2011) (evaluating the historical, cultural, political, and
institutional explanations for the failure of judicial review in Japan); Shigenori
Matsui, Why Is the Japanese Supreme Court so Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1375 (2011) (examining why the Japanese Supreme Court has developed
such a conservative constitutional jurisprudence).
21
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] 1896, art. 731 (“A man who has attained 18 years of
age, and a woman who has attained 16 years of age may enter into marriage.”),
available at
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?re=02&co=01&ia=03&x=29
&y=9&al[]=C&ky=civil+code&page=27.
22
Id. art. 733.
23
See id. art. 772 (stating a presumption that the husband is the father of a child
conceived during marriage, and that a child born within 300 days after dissolution
of the marriage is “presumed to have been conceived during marriage.”).
24
See id. art. 819, para. 4. (“A father shall only exercise parental authority with
regard to a child of his that he has affiliated if both parents agree that he shall
have parental authority.”).
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dignity and the essential equality of the sexes”.25 This language is even
reiterated in Article 2 of the Civil Code. 26 Nonetheless, these
discriminatory provisions have been upheld by prior Supreme Court
precedents finding them not to violate the constitution.27
Therefore, the Inheritance Case might signal the tantalizing
possibility of the Court more actively challenging the other inequalities
and anachronisms that remain enshrined in the Civil Code,
notwithstanding decades of change in Japanese society. As we shall see,
however, the Registration Case suggests otherwise.
B. The Facts, Issues and Rationale
i.

The Facts

The facts of the Inheritance Case are simple enough. A decedent “P” - died in July 2001, leaving as heirs his legitimate children (the
Appellees) and children born out of wedlock (the Appellants). 28 The
Appellees had petitioned the trial court for a declaratory judgment
confirming Appellants’ statutory share of P’s estate. 29 Finding no
constitutional problems, the trial court ordered that the estate be
distributed in accordance with Article 900(iv), that is, with Appellants
receiving only half the shares of Appellees.30 Appeals eventually resulted
in the case being heard by the Supreme Court.

25

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 24.
See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] 1896, art. 2 (“This Code must be construed in
accordance with honoring the dignity of individuals and the essential equality of
both sexes.”), available at
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=Civi
l+Code&x=0&y=0&ia=03&ky=&page=4 (Part I, II and III) [hereinafter MINPŌ
Parts I-III].
27
For example in a brief decision in 1995, the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme
Court reconfirmed the constitutionality of the Article 733 prohibition on women
remarrying within six months of divorce on the grounds that the discriminatory
treatment had a rational basis: the policy goal of minimizing confusion over the
paternity of children born shortly after the divorce. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
(3rd Petty Bench) Dec. 5, 1995, 177 ATSUMARI-MIN [SHŪMIN] 243,
http://www.courts.go.jp/search/jhsp0030?hanreiid= 76107&hanreiKbn=02.
28
Inheritance Case, supra note 1, para. 1.
29
Id.
30
Id.
26
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The Issues

In order to arrive at its conclusion that the Civil Code provision
violated the constitution, the Grand Bench had to deal with two major
issues. The first was justifying the reversal of its own holding in the 1995
Decision.31 Eighteen years is not a long time in jurisprudential terms, so
the Court had to articulate a reason why what had recently been
constitutional no longer was. The second was implementation. 32 By the
time the Court issued its ruling over a decade had passed since P’s death.
In order to give relief to the Appellants, it would have to find that Article
900(iv) was unconstitutional at the time of P’s death. If such a ruling had
general retroactive effect, it could potentially throw into question the
validity of the settlement of thousands of other estates that had been
achieved during the interim. How the Court dealt with both of these issues
is discussed in more detail below.
iii.

The Rationale

On its face, the differing treatment accorded illegitimate children
by Article 900(iv) would seem to present a prima facie case of
discrimination based on “social status or family origin” in violation of
Article 14(1).33 However, due to the central role of marriage in Japanese
family law and the historical context described in Part IV.A.1, the
provision survived for over half a century. In the 1995 Decision, the Court
devoted several pages of text to explaining why Article 900(iv) did not
violate the equal protection clause, as encapsulated in a summary
paragraph:
Since the Civil Code has adopted the system of marriage
by law, the reason of enactment of the Provision has a
reasonable ground. The fact that the Provision set out the
statutory inheritance share of an illegitimate child at onehalf that of the legitimate child cannot be regarded as
excessively unreasonable in relation to the reason of
enactment, and exceeded the scope of reasonable
discretion granted to the legislature. The Provision cannot

See id. pt. 3 (explaining the Court’s rationale for ruling counter to the 1995
Decision).
32
See id. pt. 4.
33
See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14 (“All of the people
are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic
or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.”).
31
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be regarded as an unreasonable discrimination and is
against Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Constitution.34
From an institutional perspective, for the Supreme Court the real
challenge in the Inheritance Case would seem to have been how to
overturn the 1995 Decision without simply declaring it to have been a
mistake. This was in fact the view expounded by the five judges who
dissented from that holding, as well as subsequent academic criticism.35
Furthermore, the challenge is greater than it first appears. Although 18
years separated the issuance of the two judgments, the Inheritance Case
Court had to find Article 2001(iv) unconstitutional as of 2001 (when P
died), a mere six years after the 1995 Decision was rendered. In the
author’s view, it is hard to describe the Grand Bench as having risen to the
challenge, but given these circumstances that is perhaps not unsurprising.
As its starting point, the Court noted that in 1947 the Civil Code
was amended to provide for an egalitarian system of inheritance in place
of the pre-war system of katoku sōzoku under which a single heir
(typically the eldest son) would inherit the status of head of household
together with control of the household’s assets (see discussion at Part
IV.A.1). 36 Nonetheless, a proviso from the pre-amendment code that
accorded illegitimate children an unequal share in certain circumstances
was incorporated into the new code. According to the Court, at the time
these amendments were made the Japanese people had a discriminatory
attitude towards children born out of wedlock.37 Furthermore, the Court
noted that during the legislative process frequent reference had been made
to various other countries of the world which at the time also had statutory
provisions that discriminated against illegitimate children in matters of
inheritance.38
The Court also spent some time discussing social change, a theme
that is central to its unconstitutionality ruling.39 Since the current Article
900(iv) was enacted in 1947, Japan experienced rapid economic

34

1995 Decision, supra note 13 (summarizing the reasoning in the case).
See, e.g., HIDEKI SHIBUTANI, KENPŌ [Japanese Constitutional Law] 199 (2007)
(describing the majority opinion in the 1995 Case as “missing the mark” in
focusing on the Civil Code family provisions being founded in legal marriage
rather than the differing treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children).
36
Inheritance Case, supra note 1.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
35
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development and the decline of extended families. 40 Life expectancy
increased, resulting in a greater need to provide for aging parents and
spouses (reflected in a 1980 amendment to the Civil Code increasing the
size of statutory share of a decedent’s estate accorded to surviving
spouses).41 Japanese people started getting married later in life (or not at
all) and had fewer children if they did.42 As a result, there had developed
increasing diversity in the views of Japanese people regarding marriage
and how families should be that has been accompanied by growth in the
variety of family and marital structures.43
The factual rationale – if it may be described in such terms – is
actually hard to follow. The Court noted that the number of children born
out of wedlock had decreased until the late 1970s, but has increased
since.44 While asserting in one place that Japanese people have come to
embrace different and more diverse attitudes towards marriage and family
structures compared to days gone by, elsewhere the Court notes that
unlike western countries, some in which births out of wedlock account for
over 50% of all births, in Japan they accounted for only 2.2% in 2011.45
The Court takes this as a sign that notwithstanding the diverse attitudes of
Japanese towards family, the importance of legal marriage is still deeply
rooted in the national consciousness46 – not so much change after all, it
seems.
The Court then turns its eyes again abroad, particularly to
European nations (where religion was supposedly the reason for
discrimination against the illegitimate) that had phased out legal
distinctions between children based on legitimacy. Germany eliminated
them in 1998 and France in 2001, leaving Japan one of the few countries
in the world still having inheritance rules that discriminated against heirs
born out of wedlock.47
Also relevant was Japan’s ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1979 and the UN Convention on

40

Id.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See id. (noting that neither the United States nor European countries continue to
distinguish between children born in or out of wedlock for inheritance as Japan
does).
41
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the Rights of the Child in 1994.48 Both instruments prohibit discrimination
based on birth. The Court further explained that the respective UN
committees overseeing these conventions had issued multiple
recommendations that Japan eliminate the discriminatory provisions from
its law, the most recent in 2010.49 This is noteworthy, since it has been
observed that references by the Supreme Court to human rights
instruments are rare (although the Court previously made such a reference
in the Nationality Act Case discussed below).50 It is thus probably even
more unusual for the Court to refer to criticism of Japan by UN human
rights bodies as part of its rationale. This might be a sign of the Court
being progressive, but could as easily be an indicator of a weak rationale
being bolstered by whatever was at hand.
The Court also drew on past litigation in related cases. It
mentioned changes in regulations relating to the registration of children
born out of wedlock as well as several lower cases challenging the
discriminatory effect of such registration systems (cases that do not appear
to merit mention in the Registration Case).51 The Court attached particular
attention to the Grand Bench’s own 2008 decision in what is referred to in
this article as the Nationality Act Case (discussed below) and which also
involved a form of statutory discrimination related to birth status.52
Legislative and regulatory history also features in the rationale of
the Inheritance Case, but primarily in the form of descriptions of
unsuccessful initiatives. According to the Court, various ministerial and
legislative committees had been proposing amendments to Article 900 to
remove the discriminatory provisions, the earliest in 1979, the most recent

48

See id. (referencing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38f0.html [hereinafter UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child]).
49
Id.
50
Lawrence Repeta, U.N. Committee Faults Japan Human Rights Performance,
Demands Progress Report on Key Issues, ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL (May 17, 2009),
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lawrence-Repeta/3147.
51
Inheritance Case, supra note 1.
52
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand Bench) Jun. 4, 2008, 2006 (Gyo-Tsu) no.
135, 62 SAIKŌ SAIIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] (Japan),
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/ 2008.06.04-2006.-Gyo-Tsu.No..135-111255.html [hereinafter Nationality Act Case].
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in 2010.53 Yet none of these initiatives ever advanced to the stage of being
submitted to the Diet.54
Yet for all the alleged social change, legal developments, and
other factors given by the Court in explanation, the rationale of the
decision remains unconvincing. It fails to come even close to identifying
anything in the nature of a “tipping point” in Japanese social conditions
between the 1995 Decision and the 2013 Inheritance Case. After all, much
of the social change and diversification of attitudes cited by the Court
were arguably well underway before 1995. Similarly, some of the
legislative efforts and both of the international treaties discussed in the
case predate the 1995 Decision.
A tipping point would have been difficult to identify anyways,
given that Petty Bench decisions subsequent to the 1995 Decision had
reconfirmed the constitutionality of Article 900(iv), the most recent in
2009 (referred to below as the “2009 Decision”). 55 The Court in the
Inheritance Case judgment does refer to the 2009 Decision, but only
references the dissenting and concurring opinions (discussed in subpart
E.1 below), which support the Court’s conclusion in the Inheritance Case.
Commendable as the Court’s holding regarding the
unacceptability of discrimination between heirs based on their legitimacy
may be, it nonetheless appears to have been arrived at through nothing
more than a bundle of assertions leading to a pre-ordained conclusion.
Ironically, the somewhat contorted rationale may be due to the
comparatively low and amorphous standard of review the Court applied.
C. Standards of Review

53

Inheritance Case, supra note 1.
The use of legislative history even by the US Supreme Court is still a complex
and sometimes controversial subject, particularly since the appointment to the
Court of Justice Scalia, who has been openly critical of the use of legislative
history as an interpretive tool. See, e.g. David Law & David Zaring, Law Versus
Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1653, 1658-59 (2010). References to the history of legislative
failures may not be as incongruous as they seem. As noted elsewhere in this
article, constitutional claims are sometimes raised in the form of suits for
damages against the state due to legislative nonfeasance by the Diet, as was the
case in the Registration Case.
55
See 2009 Decision, supra note 14; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (1st Petty Bench)
Oct. 4, 2004, 1884 HANJI 40; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (1st Petty Bench) Mar.
31, 2003, 1820 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 64; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (2nd Petty
Bench) Mar. 28, 2003, 1820 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 62; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
(1st Petty Bench) Jan. 27, 2000, 1707 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 121.
54
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Despite the clear wording of Article 14(1), all that is generally
required for a statutory provision having discriminatory effect is for it to
have a “rational basis” (gōritekina konkyo), a fairly low threshold that can
be traced back to a 1964 Grand Bench decision that is also the starting
point for the analysis in the Registration Case. 56 Constitutional scholars
have long argued that at least the categories specifically enumerated in
Article 14(1) (race, creed, sex, social status and family origin) should
enjoy a higher standard of judicial scrutiny when used as the basis for
discriminatory treatment by law or government acts.57 The Supreme Court,
however, has not attached any special significance to the enumerated
categories and for most of its history has uniformly applied an extremely
low standard of review in upholding discriminatory legislation of all types.
For example, as described by Professor Craig Martin: “The Supreme
Court of Japan has almost exclusively, until 2008, employed a
rudimentary ‘rationality test’ similar to that initially developed in the early
equal protection cases in the United States, and it has applied it
universally in respect of all forms of discrimination.”58
In other words, the standard of review in Japanese equal
protection cases in Japan has long been comparable to the US “rational
basis” standard, the lowest standard of review used by the Supreme Court.
Since virtually all government activities are justified based on the public
welfare and it is rare for governments to engage in blatantly irrational
discrimination, this standard has resulted in most equal protection claims
failing, though of course the same could be said for constitutional claims
of any other type as well. In the family sphere, other discriminatory

Registration Case, supra note 3; see also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand
Brench) May 27, 1964, 18 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 676,
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/ js_20100319121321508675.pdf.
57
See, e.g., SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN 176 (2011)
(“[W]hile most academics have suggested the courts should distinguish between
forms of discrimination and employ a more vigorous standard of review to
discrimination based on the grounds enumerated in article 14, the Supreme Court
has not shared this view. Rather, it has viewed discrimination based on these
enumerated grounds merely as examples of unreasonable discrimination and has
thus applied a very lenient standard of review to many forms of discrimination.”).
58
Craig Martin, Glimmers of Hope: The Evolution of Equality Rights Doctrine in
Japanese Courts from a Comparative Perspective, 20 DUKE J.COMP. INT’L L. 167,
170 (2010).
56
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provisions of the Civil Code have been upheld based on this rational basis
standard.59
This being the case, what may be surprising about equal
protection jurisprudence in Japan is not that there have been so few
successful challenges based on Article 14(1), but that there have been any
at all. For many, the surprise is likely to be compounded by reading the
very first instance in which the Japanese Supreme Court found a statute
unconstitutional, a decision based on the finding of an Article 14(1)
violation.
The so-called “Patricide Case” of 1973 resulted in the Court
invalidating provisions of the Penal Code that resulted in the punishment
for homicide varying depending upon the relationship between the killer
and the victim; persons who killed parents or other lineal ascendants were
subject to more severe punishments than those who killed strangers or
children or descendants.60 Although the Court was almost unanimous in
finding the provision unconstitutional, there was a significant disparity of
rationales as to why. As noted by Professor Martin, the Court never
precisely identified the type of discrimination at issue in the case even
though that would seem to be the crux of an equal protection case.61 The
true significance of the Patricide Case is thus best sought in it being the
first instance of the Supreme Court invalidating a statute and perhaps as a
partial rejection of the feudally-rooted Confucian system of social
ordering that had long prevailed in Japan.62

59

For example, the women-only six month waiting period for remarriage was
upheld because it was intended to serve the rational goal of preventing the
occurrence of conflicting presumptions about paternity. Law, supra note 18.
60
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand Brench) Apr. 4, 1973, 1970(A) no. 1310, 27
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 265,
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1973.04.04-1970-ANo.1310.html [hereinafter Patricide Case]; see Martin, supra note 58 at 200
(discussing the Patricide Case).
61
Martin, supra note 58 at 201. Note that as in the Inheritance Case, the Court in
the Patricide Case also had to deal with a prior holding of the Court finding the
provision at issue to be constitutional. See id. at 200 & n.98 (citing Saikō
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (1st Petty Bench) May 24, 1956, 10 Saikō Saibansho KEIII
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 734). Note also that the majority of Justices upheld the
concept of the moral precepts about respecting elders being incorporated into law,
finding the penal code provision to be unconstitutional not because the
punishments for elder-slaying were harsher than for other types of homicide, but
because they were disproportionately harsher. Id. at 201.
62
See id.
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Although the Patricide Case may offer little as an example of
coherent Article 14(1) jurisprudence, three of the Court’s
unconstitutionality rulings preceding the Inheritance Case were also made
on equal protection grounds. However, two of these involved
malapportionment in Diet seats. 63 Since those cases also implicated
Article 44 of the Constitution, which enunciates a separate equalprotection guarantee in connection with rights of political participation,
they are best considered as applying a different standard than was
applicable to the Inheritance Case.64
The Nationality Act Case was the next instance of the Court
invalidating a law based only on the equal protection guarantee in Article
14. 65 The Nationality Act Case also involved statutory discrimination
related to birth status. Specifically, the Nationality Act contained a
provision that made children born out of wedlock to a Japanese father
eligible for Japanese citizenship only if the Japanese father had

See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand Bench) July 17, 1985, 1984 (Gyo tsu)
no. 339, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1100,
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/ 1985.07.17-1984-Gyo-TsuNo.339.html [hereinafter Second Malapportionment Case]; Saikō Saibansho [Sup.
Ct.] (Grand Bench) Apr. 14, 1976, 1974 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 75, 30 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 223 [hereinafter First Malapportionment Case].
64
This characterization is an oversimplification intended to avoid being
sidetracked by an extremely dense area of constitutional jurisprudence. As noted
by one scholar, the fact that courts have treated the enumerated categories of
prohibited discrimination in Article 44 the same as those in Article 14(1), that is,
as a list of examples rather than categories subject to higher scrutiny, suggests
that Article 44 does not establish a higher standard of review. Tomonobu Hayashi,
Article 44 in SHINKIHONHŌ KOMENTARU – KENPŌ 319 (Hitoshi Serizawa, Masato
Ichikawa, Shōjirō Sakaguchi eds., 2011). Prevailing academic theory holds that
Article 44 should be construed as establishing a higher standard of review. Id. It
could also be argued that the malapportionment cases can be further distinguished
because voting rights also implicate the right to choose public officials under
Article 15 and the basic principle of popular sovereignty supposedly underlying
the entire Constitution and expressed in its Preamble and in Article 1. Academic
theory aside, in its November 2013 rulings on malapportionment, the Grand
Bench did not appear to attach any particular significance to Article 44,
mentioning it once or twice as a relevant provision and then including it in
subsequent references to “Article 14(1) etc. [tō].” Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
(Grand Bench), Nov. 20, 2013 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 226, available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/ english/judgments/text/2013.11.20-2013.-Gyo-Tsu.No..209%2C.210%2C.211.html (English translation).
65
See Nationality Act Case, supra note 52.
63
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acknowledged paternity before birth. 66 Even if a Japanese father
acknowledged paternity after birth, a child born out of wedlock could only
be eligible for Japanese nationality if the parents subsequently married.67
The Grand Bench found this form of discrimination to be
unconstitutional.68
One of the reasons the Nationality Act accorded disparate
treatment to children born out of wedlock depending upon when paternity
was acknowledged was to prevent fraudulent acknowledgments being
used for the purpose of conferring nationality. 69 In theory, it would be
possible for unscrupulous Japanese men to “sell” Japanese nationality to
the children of foreigners by acknowledging paternity for a fee. In a world
of simple rational basis scrutiny, this might have been enough for the
provision to pass muster. In its opinion, the Court noted that preventing
fraudulent acknowledgements of paternity was a rational policy goal, yet
concluded there was not a rational connection between that goal and the
distinction imposed by the law:
[W]e should conclude that although the legislative
purpose itself from which the Distinction is derived has a
reasonable basis, reasonable relevance between the
Distinction and the legislative purpose no longer exists
due to the changes in social and other circumstances at
home and abroad, and today, the provision of . . . the
Nationality Act imposes an unreasonable and excessive
requirement for acquiring Japanese nationality. Moreover,
since the Distinction involves another distinction . . . we
must say that it causes a child born out of wedlock who
satisfies only the requirement of being acknowledged by a
Japanese father after birth to suffer considerably
disadvantageous discriminatory treatment in acquiring
Japanese nationality, and even if we take into
consideration the discretionary power vested in the
legislative body when specifying requirements for
acquisition of Japanese nationality, we can no longer find

66

Nationality Act, Act No. 147 of 1950, art. 3, para. 1 (Japan).
Id.
68
Nationality Act Case, supra note 52.
69
See id. (“[I]f Japanese nationality is to be granted to a child by reason of
acknowledgment by a Japanese father before legitimation takes place, fictitious
acknowledgement is likely to occur in an attempt to acquire Japanese
nationality.”).
67
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any reasonable relevance between the consequence arising
from the Distinction and the aforementioned legislative
purpose.70
The Court thus seemed to be applying a new standard of review in
a discrimination case, one that despite continuing to be framed in terms of
“rationality,” went further to look at the balance of interests at stake. As
characterized by Professor Martin, the majority opinion contains all the
elements of the framework of a Canadian-style “proportionality
analysis”.71 For this reason, Martin characterizes the Nationality Act Case
as a possible turning point, a “glimmer of hope” that the Court might be
moving in the direction of a more nuanced and, perhaps more importantly,
a higher standard of review in discrimination cases.72
D. The Inheritance Case: Another Glimmer of Hope?
Despite the new direction suggested by the Nationality Act Case,
the 2013 Inheritance Case displays few signs of this higher standard being
applied. Even using the rational basis standard, the Court had to articulate
why a statutory provision that had been found to have a rational basis not
only in 1995 but in 2009 as well no longer did. As discussed above, it is
questionable whether the Court presented a convincing argument even
with this low standard, so perhaps applying a higher standard would have
required more specificity and, paradoxically, been more difficult.
Yet perhaps the Court did not need to do more in this respect if its
goal was to challenge a form of discrimination that most rational people
would find difficult to justify, particularly since the discrimination is
based on an attribute that victims have no control over – the marital status

70

Id.
Martin, supra note 58, at 235.
72
The Nationality Act Case is generally regarded as an example of “progressive”
or “successful” judicial review in Japan and has been widely praised by Japanese
and foreign scholars alike. While not objecting to the substantive result, the
author actually found the case to be disturbing. Despite being a highly fractious
judgment with a majority opinion, two separate dissenting opinions and several
concurring opinions, the one point on which virtually all of the justices seemed to
be able to agree was that “Japanese nationality… [is]an important legal status that
means a lot to people in order to enjoy the guarantee of fundamental human rights,
obtain public positions or receive public benefits in Japan.” Nationality Act Case,
supra note 52 (emphasis added). Similar language to this taken from the majority
opinion appears in the dissenting and concurring opinions as well. See id. What
that language implies regarding the fundamental human rights of non-citizens in
Japan is a subject that will have to be left for another day.
71
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of their parents.73 If one assumes that the Court decided to overturn the
1995 Decision first and developed the rationale later, the explanation
given in the Inheritance Case may be as much as one can expect.
The preceding is likely a very “American” view of the rationale
given in the Inheritance Case. Constant disappointment with the lack of
apparent depth of analysis is the likely fate of most American lawyers
reading Japanese Supreme Court judgments. Starting with the deep
continental roots in Japanese law and jurisprudence, there are some very
basic differences in approach to constitutional cases between the courts of
Japan and the United States, differences that have both been explained at
great length elsewhere but that also render expectations of American-style
analysis unrealistic.74 Still, it is hard to find a further “glimmer of hope” in
the Inheritance Case, at least with respect to the manner in which the
Court reached its conclusion.75
E. Implementation
i.

The Significance

Insofar as in the Inheritance Case the Supreme Court arrived at a
decision that many people probably agree with, albeit a decade or two late,
the rationale by which it did so may not be particularly important. 76

See 1995 Decision, supra note 13 (dissenting Toshijiro et al.) (“Discriminating
by law against an illegitimate child, who is by no means responsible for the birth,
on the ground of birth is in excess of the purpose of legislation [Article 900(iv)],
i.e. the respect for and protection of marriage; there is no substantial relationship
between the purpose of the law and the means of achieving it, and therefore, it
cannot be found to be reasonable.”).
74
See, for example, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1601 (2011), the entire issue of which
is devoted to subjects discussed at a symposium on the subject of “Decision
Making of the Japanese Supreme Court.”
75
In part to draw attention to another difference between the constitutional
jurisprudence of the Japanese Supreme Court and constitutional courts such as the
US Supreme Court, it should be noted that, due to timing, this article was written
without the benefit of reference to the commentary typically published by the lead
research judge who helped the Justices with researching and writing the opinion.
See Masako Kamiya, “Chōsakan”: Research Judges Toiling at the Stone Fortress,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1601 (2011).
76
Even significant Japanese Supreme Court cases seem to be fated to be reduced
to a one or two sentence proposition, usually expressing a general principle,
which is then reproduced in annotations and is what students have to remember in
tests. The Supreme Court helps this process along by underlining those parts of its
judgments that it considers particularly significant. With respect to the portion of
the Inheritance Case describing the rational the Court used to arrive at is finding
73
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However, from the standpoint of the evolution of the judicial power in
Japan, the case may prove to be highly significant for a different reason:
the manner in which it dealt with the tricky problem of the potential
impact of its unconstitutionality ruling.
To understand the significance of the Inheritance Case in this light,
it may help to look more closely at the 2009 Decision – the most recent
prior instance in which the Court had reaffirmed the constitutionality of
Article 900(iv). Since the majority opinion merely followed the holding of
the 1995 Decision, it did not need to do anything more than declare the
provision to be constitutional and reject the appeal. A strong dissent by
Justice Imai, who had also been on the court in the Nationality Act Case,
argued that the Court should have applied the higher standard of review
from the Nationality Act Case to find Article 900(iv) to be
unconstitutional.77
In the author’s opinion, however, the most instructive part of the
2009 Decision is the concurrence of Justice Takeuchi Yukio, the only
member of the Court who was still on the bench when the Inheritance
Case was decided. Prophetically, Justice Takeuchi starts with the
proposition that the majority opinion was only confirming that Article
900(iv) did not lack a rational basis for Article 14(1) purposes as of the
year 2000 (when the estate at issue went into probate), and that it was still
possible for changes in social circumstances to render the provision
unconstitutional in the future.78 This is the conclusion the Court reached a
mere four years later in the 2013 Inheritance Case.79
Despite concurring in the majority opinion, Justice Takeuchi
nonetheless expressed the view that as of 2009, there was a “strong
possibility” that the provision was now unconstitutional. 80 However, he
continued, nine years had passed since the estate at issue was probated,

of unconstitutionality, the only part the Court deemed worth underling was the
conclusion itself: “The provisions [Article 900(iv)] should be considered to
contravene Article 14(1) at least by the time of July 2001.” See Inheritance Case,
supra note 1 (underlining is absent in English translation).
77
For a discussion of the 2009 Decision, see Martin, supra note 58, at 239-242.
Professor Martin describes the 2009 Decision as appearing to run counter to the
“glimmer of hope” presented by the Nationality Act Case.
78
2009 Decision, supra note 14 (Takeuchi, J. concurring).
79
Knowing this arguably renders the holding of the Inheritance Case even more
incoherent, since in the 2009 Decision Justice Takeuchi is acknowledging that
Article 900(iv) might still have a rational basis as of 2000, while in the
Inheritance Case he and the rest of the Court find that it no longer does as of 2001.
80
Id.
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and if the Court were to declare Article 900(iv) to be void on
constitutional grounds effective as of 2000, the validity of countless estate
settlements during that period would be thrown into uncertainty. 81
Additionally, cases might be reopened and the law would be thrown into
confusion.
ii.

The Dilemma

This view that “the law is unconstitutional but if we invalidate it a
lot of people would be inconvenienced” may well express the dilemma
faced repeatedly by the Supreme Court in the development of its
constitutional jurisprudence. Certainly this view has played a key role in
the long succession of malapportionment cases.82 What should the Court
do and what can the Court do are two very different questions and, in the
author’s opinion, the Court’s resolutions can often be understood as an
exercise in paying lip service to the former question while substantively
addressing the latter. This is typically done in a way that is non-disruptive
and involves essentially ratifying the status quo. In this sense, Justice
Takeuchi’s concurrence in the 2009 Decision is noteworthy because it is
unusual for the dilemma to be expressed so openly.
Furthermore, “what if we issue a ruling but everyone ignores us”
is likely a dilemma for constitutional courts everywhere, but perhaps
particularly so for Japanese courts. This is suggested by the fact that
within a few weeks of the historic ruling having been issued, the Justice
System Committee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) initially
refused to amend the Civil Code to remove the discriminatory provision
from Article 900(iv).83 They subsequently relented and by the time this
article was ready for publication an amendment to the Civil Code excising
the discriminatory provision had been passed and taken effect.84
Nonetheless, conservative LDP committee members were
apparently unconvinced by the Grand Bench’s arguments about changing
times and international treaty obligations. Some expressed concern that

81

Id.
See supra note 64.
83
Jimin hōmu bukai minpō kaiseian no ryōshō miokuri [LDP Legal Working
Group Defers Approval of Proposed Amendment], NHK NEWSWEB (Oct. 29,
2013), http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20131029/ k10015646411000.html
(article has since been deleted by the news agency) (copy on file with author).
84
Kyodo Jiji, Equal Inheritance Rights Now Law[,] but Illegitimate Birth
Registries Stand, THE JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/ 2013/12/05/national/japan-enacts-bill-to-enddiscrimination-of-out-of-wedlock-children/#.U07rs_ldUdc.
82

119

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9

changing the law would destroy the “traditional family system.” 85 One
parliamentarian went so far as to assert “if we change the law in
accordance with this absurd [hijōshiki] Supreme Court decision, there will
be more and more children born out of wedlock and the family system
will collapse.”86 Granted, some of this may have been mere posturing for
conservative voters. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that over two decades
passed before the provisions found unconstitutional in the Patricide Case
were removed from the Penal Code.87
Whether the legislative branch respects the judgments of the
judicial branch to the extent of reflecting them in statutes is a question that
has obvious implications for the status of the Supreme Court and the
judiciary as a whole. A similar question is raised by considering the
possible effect on how the Court would be perceived if it issued a
judgment that reopened countless disputes over inherited property that all
the heirs involved thought had been settled. In a way, the issue of
implementation and effect discussed by Justice Takeuchi in his
concurrence in the 2009 Decision is one that goes to the heart of the
Supreme Court’s judicial power.
iii.

The Solution

In the Inheritance Case, the Grand Bench confronted the issue of
implementation head on. It did so by declaring that its finding that Article

See, e.g., Don’t Undermine the Inheritance Bill, THE JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 6,
2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/11/06/editorials/dontundermine-inheritance-bill/#.Ut4_i7RUvIU (“Some lawmakers quoted in the
media even suggested that they might defy the ruling by the nation’s top judicial
authority if it appeared to conflict with their own values.”).
86
LDP Legal Working Group Defers Approval of Proposed Amendment, supra
note 83. Having spent a significant amount of time talking to Japanese people in
various walks of law about family law issues, the author can attest that a common
theme in many of these discussions (particularly with people in leadership
positions) is the assertion that some sort of “traditional family values” exist,
though they rarely seem to date further back than the Tokyo Olympics of 1964,
the golden age of Japanese history, which Japanese baby-boomers seem to use as
the gold-standard. In reality, “traditional” family values were much more
complicated. Among other things, those who complain about children being born
out of wedlock ignore the important role they have played in the most central of
Japanese political institutions: the imperial household. Among other things, both
the Meiji and Taisho emperors were born to concubines.
87
During this period, the problem of subsequent constitutional challenges was
avoided through the simple expedient of prosecutors never pressing charges under
the offending provision. Regarding the legislative change to implement the
Patricide Case, see SHIBUTANI, supra note 35, at 198-98.
85
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900(iv) was void on constitutional grounds did not have any legal effect
on any estates the settlement of which had already been conclusively
settled during the period since P’s death. Structuring the effects of its
judgments is a new thing for the Court. As noted in the concurrence of
Justice Seishi Kanetsuki, there are no prior instances of the Court ruling in
such a way regarding the binding nature of its own judgments. In principle
a holding of unconstitutionality should have a general retroactive effect.88
The Court has long had a practice of underlining what it considers
to be the important parts of its rulings, presumably so lazy law students
and annotators will be sure to remember and excerpt the correct parts.89 In
the Inheritance Case two sections are underlined in this manner: (i) the
comparatively short sentence declaring Article 900(iv) to be void on
Article 14(1) grounds, and (ii) the longer sentence restricting the impact of
the holding to the estate of P and other estates the settlement of which has
not been concluded.90 A further indicator of the importance of the latter
part of the ruling is suggested by the fact that two separate concurring
opinions discussed its significance.91
This latter aspect of the case may prove to be far more significant
in the development of the Court’s jurisprudence than the
unconstitutionality ruling itself. By essentially empowering itself to
structure unconstitutionality rulings that have only limited effect, the
Court may be laying the groundwork for playing a more assertive role.
Somewhat paradoxically, in the Japanese context it is likely easier for the
Court to be assertive if it can do so without being overly disruptive. The
decision could thus come to be seen as a milestone on the Court’s path to
achieving greater recognition and acceptance in the eyes of Japanese
people.
Or perhaps it won’t. On that note let us turn now to the
Registration Case, the judgment of which was rendered just a few weeks
after that of the Inheritance Case.

IV. THE REGISTRATION CASE
F. Background

88

See Inheritance Case, supra note 1 (Kanetsuki, J. concurring).
Although on its English website the Supreme Court provides translations of
some of its judgments, this underlining is not replicated in the English versions.
90
See id. (underlining is absent in English translation).
91
See id. (Kanetsuki, J. concurring); id. (Chiba, J. concurring).
89
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As a judgment, the Registration Case is simpler and shorter.
However, particularly for the non-Japanese reader the contextual
background required to understand it may be more complex. Indeed, the
issue that was the crux of the case – the requirement that parents indicate
whether a child is legitimate or not when reporting the birth to family
register authorities – may be difficult to understand for Western readers
unfamiliar with Japan’s system of family law. Indeed, the need to
“register” a family may itself seem unusual not only to non-Japanese
people but to at least some Japanese people as well. The challenge in the
Registration Case was, after all, brought by a Japanese family.
Accordingly, before discussing the case itself this article will take a
contextual detour through the family register system and the current and
past system of family law upon which it is based.
iv.

The Family Register and Family Law

In Japan the family is tied to two registration systems, the family
register (koseki) and the residence register (jūminkihondaichō). 92 Such
registration systems have a long history in Japan, which had highly
developed systems of household and tax registration as far back as the
eighth century.93 Both systems were implicated in the Registration Case
but the discussion that follows deal mainly with the family.
As the name suggests, the family register is a registry of family
units. Shortly after the Meiji Restoration Japan’s national government
introduced a national system of family registers modeled on earlier
systems that had been used on a regional basis. 94 It was based on the
system of extended families that prevailed at the time. 95 However, these
structures may be best thought of as “households” rather than families.96
The traditional family unit that this system of registration system sought to

92

See generally KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947; JŪMIN
KIHONDAICHŌHŌ [Basic Resident Register Act], Act No. 81 of 1967.
93
See CARL STEENSTRUP, A HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868 44 (1991)
(noting the existence of household registers and tax registers in discussing the
Taika Administrative reforms of that period).
94
KOSEKIHŌ [(Initial) Family Register Act], Ministerial Decree No. 170 of 1871,
available at
http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/viewKaisei.do?i=yxoUt4k1zZocXPbcmtZE2Q
%3d%3d.
95
See, e.g., STEENSTRUP, supra note 93, at 130-33 (discussing the ie system
during the Tokugawa Period).
96
The “ko” in koseki originally meant “house” rather than “family” (“seki” means
“registration” or “document evidencing registration”) and is still used in Japanese
when counting houses.
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reflect was the “ie”, a Japanese term that also means “house” but might
also be translated “extended family” or again “household”.
The ieseido or “household system” was codified in the family law
provisions of the Civil Code adopted in 1898, which defined the “house”
as being comprised of such relatives of the head of the house as are in his
house, and the husbands and wives of such relatives.97 A Family Register
Act was passed at the same time in order to reflect the contents of this
law. 98 Although largely a system of record-keeping administration, the
family register is inextricably tied to the Civil Code, which defines the
types of relationships subject to registration.
The traditional “household” system was inherently feudal and
patriarchal in that it organized families around a koshu, or head of
household. “Head of household” was a legally-recognized status generally
accorded to the senior legitimate male member of the household. By law
the head had had significant powers over junior members and family
property.99 For example, a junior member could not choose a residence,

97

See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.], Act No. 9 of 1898, art. 732 [hereinafter Old
Civil Code]; ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A
PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK 111-120 (1976) (describing the old family law system
and the significant amendments made to the provisions of Part IV during the postwar American occupation).
98
KOSEKIHŌ [(Old) Family Register Act], Act No. 12 of 1898, available at
http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/viewEnkaku.do?i=yxoUt4k1zZocXPbcmtZE2Q
%3d%3d [hereinafter Old Family Register Act]. This Family Register Act was
completely modified again in 1914. KOSEKIHŌ [Revised (Old) Family Register
Act], Act No. 26 of 1914, available at
http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/viewEnkaku.do?i=yxoUt4k1zZocXPbcmtZE2Q
%3d%3d.
99
See Old Civil Code, supra note 97, art. 748 (assigning all family property as
property of the head of the household unless specifically acquired in the name of
the junior member). As noted by Professor Michihiko Wada, the formal structure
anticipated by the pre-war family system did not necessarily reflect the realities of
family life:
A legal house was generally a group of persons comprising of three-tofour generations, which could normally include several married couples with their
children (or grandchildren), with one househead. In social reality, however, such
members of a house did not necessarily live in the same place. Many, especially
the second and younger sons with their families, lived and worked in cities as a
result of industrialization, away from their rural (in many cases, farming)
househeads, who no longer exercised any effective control over these members
and their families.
Mikihiko Wada, Abolition of the House (ie) Under the Occupation: Or the Two
Faces of Koseki: A Janus, 26 LAW IN JAPAN 99, 108 (2000).
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marry, or enter into an adoptive relationship against the will of the head of
the household.100 The head also had duties, including the duty to support
other members of the household. 101 The head of household was also a
heritable status, one that was transmitted not only upon the death of an
existing head, but upon their formal retirement or loss of Japanese
nationality. 102 The rules of succession relating to this status essentially
favored the oldest legitimate son of the prior head.103
Although these rules no longer applied in postwar Japan, for
purposes of understanding the historical background to the Registration
Case it should also be noted that the old Civil Code also had specific rules
dealing with children born out of wedlock. If the father acknowledged
paternity the child could enter the household as a shoshi (an
acknowledged illegitimate child whose status within the household was
legally inferior to that of legitimate children), but only with the consent of
the head.104 Otherwise such children entered the mother’s household.105
It is important to understand that the ie system was also part of a
system of public administration, since it allowed the government to
implement policy through the head of the household. 106 The family
register facilitated (and still facilitates) this governance system by both
serving as a source of information about families and an instrument for
administrative intervention in them. 107 Under the ie system the family
register system would identify the head of a household and thus allow the
government to know who was responsible for the household’s members
and property.
The koseki system initially established in 1872 was used to
implement basic government functions such as taxation and
conscription.108 Although the initial register system was public, its utility

100

Id. arts. 749-50.
Id. art. 747. See also id. arts. 954-63 (setting forth more detailed rules as to the
duties of support that existed within the household unit).
102
Id. arts. 964-85. See also id. art. 752 (prohibiting the head of household from
resigning this status unless he reached the age of sixty, at which point he could
formally transfer the status to the next in line, typically the eldest legitimate son).
103
Id. art. 970.
104
Id. arts. 735, 827-36.
105
Id. art. 735.
106
OPPLER, supra note 97, at 120.
107
Wada, supra note 99, at 106-08; MIKIHIKO WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI [The
Abolition of the Ie System] 214 (2010).
108
See WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 418 (acknowledging the
family register’s easily overlooked value as a source of statistical information
101
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in commerce led to a person’s family register details being a matter of
public record, since it could be used to confirm creditworthiness. Given
the nature of the ie system, the head of the household or his eldest
legitimate son would be far better credit risks than any other member since
they would either have or could be expected to inherit the power to
dispose of the household’s property. Its status as a public record remained
a feature of the family register system until increased concerns over the
protection of privacy led to 1976 amendments that limited access
generally to members of the applicable family.109
While the above description is largely of historical interest, it is
important to understand that from its inception in the system described
above, the family register system in Japan still exists primarily to define a
limited range of legally significant family relationships or statuses for
purposes of interactions with the rest of society and the government.
Though not a perfect analogy, it may be helpful for western readers to
think of the family registry as something akin to a real estate title registry,
which enables government agencies and potential purchasers or
mortgagors to confirm the legal status of a particular piece of land.110 The
family register is no longer a public document, but its role as part of a
system of governance remains, even today. And although the ie system is
also now a matter of historical interest, as we shall see it has cast a long
shadow over both family attitudes and the way the family register system
operates in 21st century Japan.

about families); Shūhei Ninomiya, Kojinjōhō no hogo to koseki kōkai gensoku no
kentō [The Protection of Personal Information and the Public Family Register
Principle], 304 RITSUMEI HŌGAKU 238, 240 (2006) (characterizing the first
national family register system established in 1871 primarily as a means of
implementing taxation, conscription and peacekeeping rather than a system of
identification).
109
Id. at 239. But see KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art.
10-2 (maintaining even today a wide range of exceptions to the privacy of family
register information, including for lawyers and other licensed professionals
requiring such information in connection with legal cases).
110
For example, under Articles 818 and 819 of the present Civil Code, parental
authority is exercised (i) by both parents during marriage, (ii) by the mother if the
child is born out of marriage and (iii) only by one parent after divorce, either by
agreement or judicial determination. See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] arts. 818-19.
Since marriage and divorce are reflected in the family register, who is entitled to
exercise parental authority on behalf of a particular (Japanese) child can be
ascertained merely by looking at the family register (or an official extract),
obviating the need to submit custody decrees or separation agreements as is often
the case in the United States, for example.
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The story of the creation of the current Japanese Constitution and
the complex demands, interactions and compromises between American
occupiers and Japanese government actors has been told in great detail
elsewhere.111 The part of the story relevant to this article is the American
insistence on the inclusion of Article 24, which had profound implications
on the system of family law just described. Article 24 reads:
Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of
both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual
cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a
basis.
With regard to choice of spouse, property rights,
inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters
pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be
enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the
essential equality of the sexes.112
Historical analysis of the process by which the Constitution was
adopted suggests that when the Diet approved the Constitution containing
this provision there were differing views as to what it meant for the ie
system. Some legislators apparently believed the system could be retained,
while others thought the new Constitution mandated abolition of the ie
system.113 Additionally, some Japanese scholars in the drafting committee,
such as Takeyoshi Kawashima, saw this as an opportunity to amend a
system of family law they already considered outdated and moribund.114

111

See, e.g., RAY A. MOORE & DONALD R. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR
DEMOCRACY: CREATING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR (2002).
112
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 24. This is not the exact
provision originally proposed by the American drafters. During the course of its
drafting and approval by the Diet various changes were made to Article 24, but
the Americans were insistent upon the inclusion of the concepts of gender
equality and respect for individual freedom. See, e.g., Moore & Robinson, supra
note 109 at 131.
113
The views of the various participants in the process of drafting and adopting
Article 24 and revising the Civil Code are discussed in great detail in WADA,
IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 25-166.
114
WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 25-166. Oppler similarly
describes the old family system as “moribund even without the pressures
accompanying the making of the Constitution: it would only have died a slower
death.” OPPLER, supra note 97, at 115.
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For their part, to the extent the Americans thought about family
law their principal concerns were with gender equality and elimination of
the “head of household.” This institution was inconsistent with principles
of equality and also was regarded as a component of the Japanese feudal
system, the dismantling of which was a core objective of the
occupation.115 Beyond elimination of the head of the household system,
the Americans did not initially press for the elimination of the ie system
itself, leaving the details of reform up to the Japanese, though free of
course to veto anything they disliked.
Thus it fell to the Japanese scholars and officials charged with
amending the Civil Code to ensure the Code’s consistency with the
egalitarian new Constitution.116 Amendments to the Family Register Act
would naturally spring from these changes, though this was complicated
by a factor to be discussed shortly.
Some of the Japanese participants advocated the complete
elimination of the ie system, while others insisted it be retained in some
form even if only as a set of moral precepts. 117 While some American
officials expressed the “private” view that elimination was desirable, it
was decided that completely eliminating the ie system from the Civil Code
would likely to trigger the veto powers implicitly retained by the
occupiers over the drafting process. 118 To assuage the conservative
members of the Japanese committee, a minor form of conspiracy was
proposed: the drafters would retain enough elements of the ie system in
the new laws so that it could be revived after the occupation if desirable.119

115

Id. at 94, 107, 131 (including on page 94 the full text of the Supreme
Commander Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur’s memo setting forth
guidelines for the new Constitution, one of which was “the feudal system of Japan
will cease.”); see also OPPLER, supra note 97, at 116-17 (regarding family law
reform).
116
OPPLER, supra note 97, at 116-17 (“While we never urged the complete
abolition of the house system, we watched with interest how the Japanese would
adjust it to the principles of the [c]onstitution. They did a more thorough job than
we had expected.”) (citation omitted).
117
WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 133-45.
118
Id.
119
This compromise is also reflected in Article 730 of the current Civil Code
which contains a vague statement about relatives having to help each other. See
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 730. This provision is understood by scholars to
have no legal effect, having been inserted as a sop to the people who objected to
the elimination of the ie system and its defined duties of support among family
members. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miyazaki, Dai 730 Jō [Article 730], in HANREI
MINPŌ 9 – SHINZOKU [CIVIL CODE ANNOTATED WITH PRECEDENTS, VOL. 9 –
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The primary vehicle for doing this was to be the Family Register Act,
which was amended so that it was based not on individuals (which
arguably would have been more consistent with Article 24 of the
Constitution) but primarily on marriages and surnames.120
The continuing significance of surnames in Japanese family law –
Article 750 of the Civil Code still contains the anachronistic requirement
that one spouse adopt the other’s surname upon marriage 121 – can be
understood in this context. Under the pre-war Civil Code, members of a
household all bore the same family surname. 122 The surname was thus
considered a possible replacement, or a foundation on which to rebuild the
ie system, though that ultimately did not happen.123
A surprising amount of debate thus went into the Family Register
Act amendments that followed the Civil Code amendments, since it was in
the latter act that some remnants of the ie system could be preserved, even
though the register system was originally intended as an administrative
tool rather than a locus of substantive family law. 124 Furthermore, the
American participants in the process were quick to appreciate the intent
behind the initial drafts. Having not insisted on eradicating the ie system
from the Civil Code, once the decision had been made to do so the
Americans overseeing the process objected strongly to efforts to keep
elements of it alive through the family register system.
For example, Oppler and his colleagues successfully blocked
early draft amendments to the Family Register Act on the grounds that
certain features, such as provisions that would allow three generations to
be registered as a single family in certain circumstances, were reminiscent

RELATIVES] 8-9 (Yoshihisa Nomi & Shintaro Kato eds., 2d. ed. 2009). A remnant
of the ie system can also be seen in Article 897 which creates an exception to the
general egalitarian rules of inheritance for “rights to ownership of a genealogy,
equipment used in rituals, and any grave“, which pass according to “who custom
dictates shall preside over rituals for ancestors” or testamentary designation.
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 897, para. 1.
120
Note that some of the participants in the process advocated a registration
system based solely on individuals. WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107 at
292-297.
121
See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 750.
122
Old Civil Code, supra note 97, art. 746.
123
Wada, supra note 99, at 118-120.
124
This doubtless explains why Article 6 of the Family Register Act requires a
family register to be organized around married couples and “children thereof with
the same surname” or an unmarried parent and “children thereof with the same
surname.” See KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 6.
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of the old ie system. 125 The Americans also pushed the Japanese to
consider a system of registration based on individuals rather than
families.126 The Japanese succeeded in resisting this demand, in part by
arguing about how much extra work and recordkeeping would be required
to do so.127
In fact, the accounts of the negotiations between the American
and Japanese sides over the Family Register Act are an example of the
clash of American-style individualism and the Japanese family-based
collectivism. The resulting system that remains in force today is a
compromise, a system of registering families based on a two-generation
nuclear family that would have been familiar to Americans. Yet, at the
same time, it was not a system based on individuals. For this reason, it is
also a system in which the matter of whether a child is born in or out of
wedlock is of fundamental importance. Children born to a married couple
are registered in the new register created at the time of the marriage and
share the couple’s surname.128 Children born out of wedlock are registered
in a new family register created for the mother and share her surname.129
The ie system was never revived, but the family register system,
which reflected at least the hope that it might be, remains in place. And
while many Japanese people themselves may find the system difficult to
rationalize, it should be remembered that its original purpose was to be a
means by which the government could gather information about the
population and, particularly in the past, use as a means of control.130 More
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WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 287-332.
See OPPLER, supra note 97, at 11214.
127
WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 295.
128
KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 18.
129
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 790. An unmarried woman would typically
remain registered in her parents’ register until marriage. However if she has a
child the Family Register Act requires a new register to be prepared for her and
the child, as in accordance with the occupation-era objections to a system
allowing for registrations spanning three generations. See KOSEKIHŌ [Family
Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 17. A child born out of wedlock may
only take the father’s surname through the intervention of a family court. MINPŌ
[MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 791, para. 1.
130
Needless to say, the registration system only works if events are registered. For
those events that are voluntarily, registration is fostered by registration being a
prerequisite to legal effect. Thus a marriage or divorce only takes legal effect
upon registration. MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 739, para. 1. Similarly, the birth
of a child must be registered within two weeks (or three months, in the case of
children born to Japanese parents abroad). See KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act],
Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 49. Note that among other things, the family registration
126
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prosaically, the family register – usually in the form of official
documentary extracts that can be obtained from the local government
administering it – is a basic form of identification in Japan.131 Whereas
westerners are likely to prove identity and family status through a
combination of documents that confirm specific events (births, marriages,
divorces, custody decrees, deaths), in Japan an extract of a person’s family
register provides a current (and thus more accurate) snapshot of a person’s
family status (the legally-significant aspects of it, at least).
This is the historical and legal context in which the Registration
Case arose. While it may appear to be a dispute over a seemingly
anachronistic and pointless documentary requirement in a government
form, it actually goes to the heart of a system of family law in which
marriage and legitimacy are central to the entire design of the system, a
design which itself reflects the remnants of a very different set of family
traditions.
v.

The Facts of the Registration Case

According to the recitation of the facts in the Supreme Court’s
judgment, two of the appellants were a man and woman who began living
together in 1999 in Tokyo.132 They were not legally married. In 2005, the
woman gave birth to a child (also named as an appellant).133 The man had
filed an acknowledgement of paternity before the birth.134 The case arose

system makes it possible for the registry authorities to confirm that the marriage
does not violate any of the prohibitions specified in the Civil Code (e.g. bigamy,
incestuous marriages, marriages by minors, etc.). See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.]
art. 740 (referencing prohibitions contained in Articles 731-737 and 739).
Furthermore, because even changes in family status resulting from court decrees
(divorce, allocation of parental authority) are reflected in the family register by
filing the decree, there is rarely any need to produce a divorce or custody decree
in day-to-day life in Japan.
131
Indeed, family registers are even proof of Japanese nationality, since only
Japanese people have a family register. The treatment of a Japanese person who
marries a foreign national is essentially the same as one who has a child out of
wedlock; a new register is created for the Japanese person (unless they have
already established their own register). See KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act
No. 224 of 1947, art. 16, para. 3. As a result, in addition to discriminating based
on legitimacy almost out of necessity, at a basic level the Japanese system of
family law also discriminates based on nationality.
132
Registration Case, supra note 3.
133
Id.
134
Id.
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when he tried to register the birth with the family register authorities.135
The form used to report births requires several items of information that
seem both incongruous and invasive of privacy. One is whether the child
was born in or out of wedlock.136
The father of the child sought to register the birth as required by
law without filling in the “in/out of wedlock” part of the form. 137 The
registry authority rejected the filing as defective.138 Without the household
registry filing being accepted, the parents were also unable to create a
residence registry for the child.139 The two sides spent a number of years
in an impasse, until 2010 when the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) sent a
directive to registry authorities around the nation essentially directing
them to seek a compromise with parents in this situation by asking them to
file a notice of birth that, while not filling in the “in/out-of wedlock” part
of the form, would allow the authorities to register the necessary details.140
If the parents did not respond then the authorities could confirm the
necessary details themselves, since the marital status of the parents would
already be apparent from their household registers.
G. The Case

135

See Registration Case, supra note 3. Although not mentioned in the case,
another way in which the Family Register Act discriminates based on legitimacy
is by requiring that notifications of births of children born out of wedlock be filed
by the mother unless she is unable to do so, in which case the filing can be made
by a cohabitant, attending doctor or midwife, or legal representative. See
KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 52. Notifications of
birth to a married couple may be filed by either the father or mother. See id.
Accordingly, the father in the Registration Case was presumably able to file
because he was cohabitating with the mother.
136
Registration Case, supra note 3; KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No.
224 of 1947, art. 49(2)(i).
137
Registration Case, supra note 3.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. One of the interesting things about Japanese family law is that a certain part
of it is shaped not by court rulings, but by MOJ guidance and directives addressed
to local registry authorities as to how to deal with the registration in situations
where the law is unclear or special circumstances apply. This is authorized by
provisions of the Family Registry Act. See KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act
No. 224 of 1947, art. 3. These provisions of the Family Register Act are also
noteworthy because they essentially subjugate the democratically-elected heads of
local governments to the instructions of unelected Ministry of Justice bureaucrats
with respect to administration of the family register.
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The parents brought suit in 2011 asserting two claims for damages
under Article 1(1) of the State Redress Act. 141 One was based on the
alleged tortious legislative nonfeasance on the part of the national
government for failing to eliminate the discriminatory provision of the
Household Registration Act. 142 The other asserted administrative
nonfeasance on the part of the authorities administering the residence
registration for failing to register the child in the residence registry. 143
Both claims were based on the argument that requiring a notation as to
legitimacy was a form of unreasonable discrimination in violation of
Article 14(1). 144 Other relief had also been sought in the lower court
proceedings (including a declaratory judgment to the effect that the
municipal authorities were obligated to register the child in the residence

141

Registration Case, supra note 3. The State Redress Act implements Article 17
of the Japanese Constitution under which the people are entitled to sue the state
for redress. See KOKKA BAISHŌ HŌ [State Redress Act], Act No. 125 of 1947.
Article 1(1) of the Act reads: “When a public officer who exercises the public
authority of the State or of a public entity has, in the course of his/her duties,
unlawfully inflicted damage on another person intentionally or negligently, the
State or public entity shall assume the responsibility to compensate therefor.” Id.
art. 1, para 1.
142
Registration Case, supra note 3. Although the Court did not directly address
the claim, a brief explanation of “legislative nonfeasance” is probably necessary,
since it is a claim that is not used as a basis for constitutional claims in the United
States. As the term suggests, a claim based on legislative nonfeasance involves an
assertion that the legislature has a constitutional obligation to enact or amend laws
necessary to address a constitutional deficiency in an existing program or give
effect to one or more provisions of the Constitution (some of which, such as the
Article 13 right to the pursuit of happiness or the Article 25 right to a minimum
standard of cultured living, are considered to be so abstract as to be nonjusticiable without further legislative definition). Since the Supreme Court defers
greatly to the discretion of the Diet such claims are rarely successful. However,
the concept of legislative nonfeasance did play a role in the reasoning of the Court
in the 2005 Overseas Voting Case, in which the Grand Bench found that the
failure of the Diet to make adequate provisions enabling equal participation by
overseas voters in Diet elections was unconstitutional. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
(Grand Bench) Sep. 14, 2005, 2001 (Gyo tsu) no. 82, 59 SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2087, available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.09.14-2001.-Gyo-Tsu.No..82%2C.2001.-Gyo-Hi-.No..76%2C.2001.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..83%2C.2001.-GyoHi-.No..77.html (English translation).
143
Registration Case, supra note 3.
144
Id.
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registry), but these had been retracted by the time of the appeal to the
Supreme Court.145
The Court rejected the Article 14 argument, noting that the
registration of the birth and notation of legitimacy did not result in a legal
distinction between children born in and out of wedlock; these were
established by the Civil Code.146 The Court then explained how the family
structures established by the Civil Code were founded in legal (registered)
marriage, with children necessarily being treated differently depending
upon whether their parents are married, including whose surname they
bear,147 and how they are registered in the first place.148 Accordingly, it
could not be said that the information requirements of the birth
registration form alone resulted in discriminatory treatment of children
born out of wedlock.
The Court acknowledged that the registration authorities could
use the information already in their possession to confirm whether a child
was born in or out of wedlock, but accepted that requiring parents to fill in
the information nonetheless served the rational goal of furthering
administrative convenience. 149 As to any concerns about privacy, the
Court asserted that the reported information about birth status was subject
to strict privacy protections and could not be easily accessed by third
parties, implying that birth status was unlikely to be a source of
discrimination from other parties.150 Finally, the Court refused to entertain
the argument that the notation “out of wedlock” (chakushutsu de nai ko)
as used in the reporting document was itself discriminatory, since it was

145

Id. Among other things, after reminders from the authorities had no effect, the
authorities made the necessary registrations without the cooperation of the parents,
as was permitted under Articles 24 and 44 of the Family Register Act. Id.; see
also KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, arts. 24, 44.
146
Registration Case, supra note 3.
147
Id. Article 790 of the Civil Code states:
(1) A child in wedlock shall take the surname of his/her parents; provided that if
the parents divorce before the child is born, the child shall take the surname of
his/her parents at the time of divorce.
(2) A child out of wedlock shall take the surname of his/her mother.
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 790.
148
Registration Case, supra note 3. See KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No.
224 of 1947, arts. 6, 18 (detailing how children are to be registered).
149
Registration Case, supra note 3.
150
Id.
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used in the Civil Code, the Family Register Act and other laws and
regulations.151
This was the final claim addressed by the Court before it rejected
the Article 14(1) argument. The Court found that Article 49(2) of the
Family Register Act, which required notation of legitimacy in birth reports,
did not establish unreasonable discrimination between legitimate and
illegitimate children.152 The only part of the judgment that is underlined is
the statement that “the Provision cannot be regarded as setting down
discriminatory treatment against a child born out of wedlock as compared
to a child born in wedlock and therefore it is not in violation of Article 14
paragraph (1) of the Constitution.”153 The Court declined to address the
appellants’ other unspecified constitutional claims.154
In a short concurring opinion, Justice Sakurai Ryūko agreed with
the conclusions of the Court but made a point of criticizing a system that
had allowed a Japanese child to go for over seven years without being
recorded in either a family register or a residence register, thereby
possibly suffering various disadvantages through no fault of his or her
own. 155 She questioned whether it was really necessary to impose such
disadvantages on children, given that the registry officials could make the
necessary notations relevant to legitimacy based on the information
available without self-reporting by parents.156
H. So Much for Social Change
Although the Registration Case was heard by a Petty Bench, all of
the judges who participated had also been part of the same Grand Bench

151

Id.
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
See id. (Sakurai, J. concurring). One of the disappointing aspects of both the
Inheritance Case and the Registration Case is how little the interests of children –
as opposed to the doctrinal purity of Japan’s marriage-centric system of law –
seem to factor into the respective conclusions. As already noted, Japan is a party
to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3 of which mandates
that inter alia that “best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” in
“all actions concerning children” by courts and other government institutions. UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 48, art. 3. While the
Inheritance Case references the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it
seems to do so more as a source of ammunition to support its conclusion rather
than as part of a reasoned consideration of how different conclusions would affect
children in the real world.
156
Registration Case, supra note 3.
152
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that decided the Inheritance Case just three weeks previously. Had there
been more time between the two cases, the language of the Inheritance
Case would likely have featured in the appellant’s briefs in the
Registration Case. And yet none of the social change, new attitudes about
marriage, increasing family diversity, international treaties proscribing
discrimination based on birth status, or legislative initiatives that had
seemed so important to the Court in the Inheritance Case merited any
comment whatsoever in the Registration Case. While the Inheritance Case
was specifically about inheritance, there was nothing about the Court’s
rationale that inherently limited it to that area of law. Indeed, the Court
addressed the case primarily within the context of supposedly greatly
changed attitudes about marriage and family.

V. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
How could the same court arrive at such seemingly incongruous
results in the same month? Unlike the historic Inheritance Case, the
holding in the Registration Case seems like business as usual for Japan’s
“conservative” Supreme Court.157 Yet viewed from the standpoint of the
Court acting in an institutionally rational manner in the exercise and
development of the judicial power, the two cases may not be as
inconsistent as they seem.
The Inheritance Case was based on a strong sentiment that existed
within the Court regarding the discrimination in Article 900(iv), a
sentiment already evident in the 1995 Decision through the five justices
who dissented. 158 This view was probably strengthened as much by
criticism of constitutional scholars and subsequent concurrences and
dissents as it was by “social change.” Furthermore, once the Court dealt
with the implementation problem by limiting the scope of its ruling, it
could naturally expect that lower courts hearing any new inheritance
disputes between legitimate and illegitimate heirs would follow its
interpretation in ignoring the discrimination in 900(iv), even if the Diet
failed to amend the Civil Code in response to its ruling.
In contrast, if the Court had declared the legitimacy designation at
issue in the Registration Case unconstitutional, the Court would by
implication call into question the entire foundation of Japanese family law,

See Law, supra note 18, at 1375 (describing the Japanese Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence as conservative).
158
1995 Decision, supra note 13.
157
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reflected in a number of provisions of the Civil Code, not just a discrete
rule of inheritance.
Furthermore, if the Court had declared the registration
requirement void, it would be interfering with a system administered by
the Ministry of Justice, which might have been more significant than
Article 900(iv).159 As noted in the Court’s discussion of legislative history,
the MOJ had long been involved in unsuccessful efforts to amend the
provision referenced in the Inheritance Case, meaning the ruling would
not likely conflict with MOJ initiatives.
As for the registration requirement, it merits note that apparently
spurred by the refutation of legitimacy-based discrimination in the
Inheritance Case, on October 1, 2013 Akashi City in Hyogo introduced a
birth report form that did not require parents to indicate such status. 160
They were immediately struck down by both MOJ officials and Sadakazu
Taniguchi, the Minister of Justice himself, who reportedly asserted that
the law did not permit local governments to create their own forms. 161 It
would be the MOJ,162 not elected local governments or even the Supreme

159

Here it is worth bearing in mind just some of the countless institutional
connections between the MOJ and the judiciary. Before the current Constitution
was implemented, the entire judiciary was essentially subordinated to the MOJ,
which exercised control over judicial personnel. Certain seats on the Supreme
Court are informally reserved for former prosecutors, the elite members of the
legal profession who control the MOJ. See Lawrence Repeta, Reserved Seats on
Japan’s Supreme Court, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1713, 1724-25, 1743 (2011). The
MOJ and the judiciary have personnel exchanges which see judges participating
in administering the MOJ, particularly in areas relevant to civil law. Id.
160
Hyōgoken Akashishi ga chakushutushi no kisai sakujo shussetodoke de
zenkoku hatsu [Aakashi city in Hyogo Prefecture is first in nation with birth
report without indication of legitimacy], KYOTO SHINBUN, (Oct. 1, 2013),
http://www.kyoto-np.co.jp/country/article/20131001000146. Apparently,
therefore, the “administrative convenience” referenced by the Registration Case
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Court exercising the judicial power, that would decide how the family
register system would be administered.
Given the context of the Inheritance Case, the Supreme Court’s
expansion of the judicial power in that case would likely be acceptable to
most stakeholders (including the general public). The Registration Case
showed the same Court being equally pragmatic. Even if the Justices had
secretly wished to invalidate the registration requirement, doing so would
have only drawn attention to the discriminatory foundations of the
nation’s family law but done nothing to remedy them. This would have
also disrupted the governance of a nationwide registration system
administered by a Ministry having a particularly complex relationship
with the judiciary. The Court trumpeted social change and changing
attitudes in the first case, while ignoring these considerations in the second.
This suggests a certain cynicism involved in the resolution of both cases,
although this conclusion could just be a reflection of the author’s own
cynicism.
In any case, the Court’s use of the Inheritance Case to hone its
power of constitutional review into a more precise tool may ultimately
make it possible for the Court to turn to some of the other inequalities that
remain deeply rooted in Japanese family law. That in turn would surely
further enhance the Court’s own legitimacy in the eyes of the Japanese
people.
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